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Abstract. RFID-Tags are small devices used for identification purposes
in many applications nowadays. It is expected that they will enable many
new applications and link the physical and the virtual world in the near
future. Since the processing power of these devices is low, they are often
in the line of fire when their security and privacy is concerned. It is widely
believed that devices with such constrained resources can not carry out
sufficient cryptographic operations to guarantee security in new applica-
tions. In this paper, we show that identification of RFID-Tags can reach
high security levels. In particular, we show how secure identification pro-
tocols based on the DL problem on elliptic curves are implemented on
a constrained device such as an RFID-Tag requiring between 8,500 and
14,000 gates, depending on the implementation characteristics. We inves-
tigate the case of elliptic curves over F2p with p prime and over composite
fields F22·p . The implementations in this paper make RFID-Tags suitable
for anti-counterfeiting purposes even in the off-line setting.
Key Words: RFID, counterfeiting, authentication, ECC, small area im-
plementations
1 Introduction
RFID-tags are low-cost pervasive devices targeted at providing identification of
goods. They consist of an antenna connected to a microchip. Because of the
presence of this microchip, they can be considered as the next generation bar
codes. One of their main advantages over bar codes is that they can be read
out without line of sight. It is expected that in the near future trillions of these
devices will be deployed. They will be used to identify goods and provide a link
between the physical and the virtual world. It is predicted that this connection
will lead to the next revolution after the Internet: The Internet of Things. Cur-
rently the main applications for RFID tags include: goods tracking in supply
chain management, automated inventory management, automated quality con-
trol, access control, payment systems, etc. In the future, however, tagged items
will also communicate with intelligent devices in the home (intelligent refrigera-
tors, washing machines, etc.) and provide additional benefits to consumers. For
example, a refrigerator will automatically detect whether the food is still OK
and warn the consumer when necessary, the washing machine will detect the
color of clothes in the washing and switch on the appropriate program, and, in
general, home appliances will be intelligent and be able to communicate with
other devices.
An emerging application of RFID-Tags that is being considered is their use
for anti-counterfeiting purposes [11]. By locating an RFID-tag with specific prod-
uct and reference information on a product, one can verify the authenticity of the
product. This is done by running a secure protocol between a tag and a reader. If
the required information is on the tag and verified to be authentic, the product
is declared to be genuine and otherwise not. In a cloning attack, the attacker
captures the necessary authentication information (obtained e.g. by eavesdrop-
ping on the channel between the tag and the reader), and stores it in a new chip.
In this way the attacker has effectively cloned the original tag. This clone cannot
be distinguished from an original tag by a reader. In order to make the cloning
of tags infeasible, it should not be possible to derive the tag secrets by active or
passive attacks. Recently a lightweight version of such an authentication proto-
col was developed in [11]. The security of the protocol is based on the Learning
Parity in the presence of Noise (LPN) problem. The protocol in [11] is proven
secure against passive and against active adversaries in a detection-based model.
Reference [25] suggests to use Schnorr’s and Okamoto’s identification protocols
over Elliptic Curves (EC) to provide security against passive and active adver-
saries, respectively. In addition, [25] provides security against physical attacks
as well, thanks to the physical properties of Physically Unclonable Functions
(PUFs) [22, 5, 26]. The authors in [25] estimated that ECC and hyperelliptic
curve cryptography (HECC) instances of secure identification protocols could
be implemented requiring less than 5,000 gates. However, memory requirements
were not specified and an explicit construction is not provided.
The fact that tags have very constrained resources (memory, power, speed,
area) but need security measures poses very interesting challenges to the security
community. First, it is natural to investigate whether existing cryptographic
algorithms can be implemented on a tag. Second, it encourages research for new
protocols and algorithms targeted at resource constrained devices. Moreover,
the research community lacks consensus as to the feasibility of implementing
public-key crypto-algorithms on (high-end) RFID tags. For example, [25] claim
that public key cryptography on a tag is possible and [1] states: “Unfortunately
asymmetric cryptography is too heavy to be implemented on a tag”.
1.1 Our Contributions
Feasibility of EC on RFID tags. We address the question of the implemen-
tation feasibility of EC based cryptography on a resource constrained device
and, in particular, on an RFID-Tag. We answer this question affirmatively.
We present ECC implementations of secure identification protocols such as
Schnorr’s [23] on an RFID-Tag. We show that by trading off performance for
area it is possible to implement EC public-key cryptography on a tag. Since
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area is an important cost factor for the price of RFID-Tags, our main fo-
cus is to minimize the area required for the implementations. Our particular
implementation of EC over binary fields has an area complexity of between
12,000 and 15,000 equivalent gates depending on the chosen field and imple-
mentation. This area complexity includes RAM and assumes a conservative
estimate of 6 equivalent gates per RAM cell (i.e. a RAM cell instantiated
as a flip-flop). If we were to use dedicated embedded RAM (see for example
[19, 9]) our smallest design would require in the order of 8,200 equivalent
gates. Notice that by todays standards this corresponds to a mid to high
range tag. Although, it is anticipated that in the near future price pressure
will continue to limit the number of gates in the ultra low cost tags, it can
also be envisioned that eventually this number of gates will be available on
all tags.
Our solution is based on identification schemes. We emphasize that our
solution is based on identification schemes such as those of Schnorr or Okamoto.
This is important because it provided us with an additional way to save area.
In contrast, the solution in [27] is based on a challenge-response protocol
(CRP) where an ECDSA signature needs to be computed. Such computa-
tion, requires the computation of a hash, thus requiring significant hardware
resources in addition to the 23,000 equivalent gates of their smallest EC pro-
cessor design. To our knowledge the best (area optimized) SHA-1 hardware
implementation is that of [12], which requires about 4,300 gates3.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief
overview of related work. We present the protocols, EC algorithms and multiplier
architectures used in our design in Sect. 3 and 4. In Sect. 5, we describe the
processor architecture used for our prototype and estimate the size of the ALU,
which is the part of the prototype that contributes the largest area to the overall
design. Finally, in Sect. 6 we discuss the results in detail and point out future
work.
2 Related Work
Low-power and compact implementations became an important research area
with the constant increase in the number of hand-held devices such as mobile
phones, smart cards, PDAs etc. Schroeppel et al. [24] presented a design for
ECC over binary fields that was optimized for power, space and time in or-
der to provide digital signatures. The processor in [24] had an area complex-
ity of 191,000 gates. The work of Goodman and Chandrakasan [8] also dealt
with energy-efficient solutions. They proposed a domain-specific reconfigurable
cryptographic processor (DSRCP) for ECC over both types of finite fields. At
50 MHz, the processor operates at a supply voltage of 2 V and consumes at most
3 The area estimates of [12] do not include the area for RAM. A similar implementation
including the area overhead of RAM requires about 10,000 gates [4].
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75 mW of power. In ultra-low-power mode (3 MHz at VDD = 0.7 V ), the pro-
cessor consumes at most 525 µW. O¨zturk et al. [21] introduced modulus scaling
techniques that are applicable for ECC over a prime field to develop a low-power
elliptic curve processor architecture. They obtained an ECC processor over the
166-bits long prime of size 30,333 gates with the performance of 31.9 msec for
point multiplication.
The work of Gaubatz et al. [7] discusses the necessity and the feasibility of
PKC protocols in sensor networks. In [7], the authors investigated implementa-
tions of two algorithms for this purpose i.e. Rabin’s scheme and NTRUEncrypt.
The conclusion is that NTRUEncrypt features a suitable low-power and small
footprint solution with a total complexity of 3,000 gates and power consumption
of less than 20 µW at 500 KHz. On the other hand, they showed that Rabin
is not a feasible solution. In [6] the authors have compared the previous two
algorithm implementations with an ECC solution for wireless sensor networks.
The architecture of the ECC processor occupied an area of 18,720 gates and
consumes less than 400 µW of power at 500 KHz. The field used was a prime
field of order ≈ 2100.
RFID-based identification is an example of an emerging technology which re-
quires authentication as a cryptographic service. This property can be achieved
by symmetric as well as asymmetric primitives. The most notable example of
a symmetric cipher implementation is the work of Feldhofer et al. [3], which
considered implementation of AES on an RFID tag. Recently, Wolkerstorfer [27]
showed that ECC based PKC is feasible on RFID-tags by implementing the
ECDSA on a small IC. This work is the first complete ECC low-power and
compact implementation that meets the constraints imposed by the EPC stan-
dard. We compare the implementation of [27] with our results in Section 6 in
more detail. We consider here an ECC solution to provide identification for an
RFID tag by means of Schnorr’s identification scheme as discussed in [25]. If only
resistance against passive attacks is needed, the Schnorr Identification scheme
can be used as it is known to be secure against passive attacks under the dis-
crete logarithm assumption. An alternative for providing more security is to
use Okamoto’s identification scheme [20], which is secure against passive, active
and concurrent attacks under the DL assumption. Very recently, McLoone and
Robshaw [15] reconsider the hardware cost of public-key cryptography for ultra
constrained area and power applications. Their implementation allows for a tag
that can participate in an authentication protocol a limited number of times.
As a result, the tag can store in memory the responses to a limited number of
authentication and thus, the hardware costs are minimal. In contrast, in this
work we consider tags that are able to participate in an authentication protocol
an unlimited number of times.
3 Secure Identification Protocols
We investigate the protocol of Schnorr shown in Fig. 1. In this case a tag (prover)
proves its identity to a reader (verifier) in a three-pass protocol. As it can be
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1. Common Input: The set of system parameters in this case consists of: (q,
a, b, P, n, h). Here, q specifies the finite field, a, b, define an elliptic curve,
P is a point on the curve of order n and h is the cofactor. In the case of tag
authentication, most of these parameters are assumed to be fixed.
2. Prover-Tag Input: The prover’s secret a such that Z = −a · P .
3. Protocol: The protocol involves exchange of the following messages:
Prover P Verifier V
r ∈R Zn
X ← r · P X -
e
ﬀ e ∈R Z2t
y = ae + r mod n y -
If y · P + e · Z = X
then accept, else re-
ject
Fig. 1. Schnorr’s identification protocol.
observed from the protocol, the critical operation is the point multiplication.
Thus, in the remainder of the paper, we describe a processor specifically suited
for this operation and cheap enough that it is suitable for anti-counterfeiting
RFID applications.
4 ECC implementations for RFID
In this section we elaborate on our choice of algorithms and we explain our strat-
egy to minimize the area of the EC processor. Our strategy can be summarize as
follows: (i) we reduce the total number of intermediate registers for calculation
of point operations, (ii) we use small digit sizes in our multiplier designs and in-
vestigate the effect of a dedicated squarer in the design’s area and performance,
and (iii) we avoid having to recover the y-coordinate of the elliptic curve point
in the tag and, in fact, only operate on the x-coordinate during the protocol.
This is, in turn, helps us avoid having to compute two finite field inverses on the
tag.
4.1 ECC Operations
In this work, we consider finite fields of characteristic two. A non-supersingular
elliptic curve E over F2n is defined as the set of solutions (x, y) ∈ F2n × F2n to
the equation: y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b where a, b ∈ F2n , b 6= 0, together with the
point at infinity, denoted by ∞.
The point or scalar multiplication is the basic operation for cryptographic
protocols and it is easily performed via repeated group operations. Here, we de-
scribe ECC operations at each level by following the top-down approach. For
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the point multiplication we chose Montgomery’s [17], which maintains the rela-
tionship P1 − P0 as invariant. Montgomery’s method is shown in Algorithm 1.
We chose to present Algorithm 1 as in [10], as this provides basic resistance
against Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks. It uses a representation where
computations are performed on the x-coordinate only in affine coordinates (or
on the X and Z coordinates in projective representation). That fact allows us to
save registers which is one of the main criteria for obtaining a compact solution.
We chose as starting point for our optimizations the formulae of Lopez and Da-
Algorithm 1 Montgomery’s Point Multiplication Method
Require: An integer k and a point P ∈ E(Fq)
Ensure: Q = k · P
1: Set k ← (knk−1 . . . k1k0)2
2: Set P0 ← P, P1 ← 2 · P
3: for i = nk − 2 downto 0 do
4: b← ki
5: P1−b ← P0 + P1, Pb ← 2 · Pb
6: end for
7: return P0
hab [14]. The original formulae in [14] require three intermediate registers (two
for addition and one for doubling). In our case we eliminate two intermediate
registers which added a few more steps to the original algorithms. The result of
our optimizations are depicted in Algorithm 2. In this way we made a trade-off
between performance and area as point operations require now 6 and 8 multi-
plications for point addition and doubling (instead of 5 and 6 M), respectively4.
Algorithm 2 EC point addition and doubling: operations that minimize the
number of registers
Require: X1, Z1, X2, Z2, x4 = x(P2 − P1)
Ensure: X(P1 + P2) = X(P3) = X3, Z3
1: Z3 ← X2 · Z1
2: X3 ← X1 · Z2
3: Z3 ← X3 + Z3
4: Z3 ← Z3
2
5: X3 ← X3 ·X2
6: X3 ← X3 · Z1
7: T ← x4 · Z3
8: X3 ← X3 + T
9:
Require: b ∈ F2n , X1, Z1
Ensure: X(2P1) = X(P5) = X5, Z5
Z5 ← Z1
2
Z5 ← Z5
2
Z5 ← b · Z5
X5 ← X1
2
X5 ← X5
2
X5 ← X5 + Z5
Z5 ← X1
2
Z5 ← Z5 · Z1
Z5 ← Z5 · Z1
4 Here, we count squarings also as multiplications.
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4.2 F2n Arithmetic
Fields of characteristic two in polynomial basis were chosen for this investigation
as arithmetic can be implemented efficiently and relatively cheaply in hardware
over these fields. Although this is well understood, few previous attempts have
been made to develop truly low area implementations of this arithmetic for ECC.
Addition of two elements c = a + b ∈ F2n is performed via an n–bitwise logical
XOR operation. The standard way to compute the product c = a · b ∈ F2n ∼=
F2[x]/f(x), and a =
∑n−1
i=0 aix
i, b =
∑n−1
j=0 bjx
j , f = xn +
∑s
i=0 fix
i, s < n, is
given by
c =
n−1∑
j=0
n−1∑
i=0
aibjx
i+j mod f = a
n−1∑
j=0
bjx
j mod f (1)
This represents the most compact solution, where the bjax
j partial products
from (1) are computed iteratively and reduction modulo f of the degree n par-
tial product polynomial is performed on each of the n iterations. The digit se-
rial multiplication algorithm [13] may be considered as a generalization of this.
Rather than processing the binary coefficients bj of b ∈ F2n serially, a number
of them are processed in parallel. Here there is scope to trade-off an increase in
gate count for increased performance. This is an important consideration in low
frequency implementations over relatively small (composite) fields as discussed
here.
Here b =
∑n−1
j=0 bjx
j , rather than being considered as n coefficients of F2
is considered as being composed of d = d n
D
e words, each word containing D
elements of F2. Now b =
∑d−1
k=0 b˜kx
kD, each b˜k =
∑D−1
l=0 bl+kDx
l, and
c =
d−1∑
k=0
(ab˜k)x
kD mod f (2)
can be calculated in d iterations. Notice that the ab˜k partial products are calcu-
lated recursively. A variant of the Song-Parhi method is illustrated as Algorithm
3. When D = 1 then d = n and b˜k = bj ∈ F2 and this method reverts to Horner
multiplication. Squaring c = a2 ∈ F2n is a special case of multiplication. It is
well known that a2 =
∑n−1
i=0 aix
2i, which can then be reduced modulo f to a
field element in F2n .
For security reasons it is typically recommended to use fields F2p where p is
a prime. As an example we investigate the cases where p = 131 and p = 139.
However, we also consider EC over a quadratic extension of F2p . For example, we
consider F2134 ≡ F(267)2 ≡ F267 [y]/g(y), where deg(g) = 2 and g is an irreducible
polynomial over F267 . In this way we can translate the arithmetic from F(2p)2 to
F2p , which results in a reduction in the size of ALU by a factor of two approxi-
mately. In a composite field F(2p)2 each element can be represented as z = xt+y
where x, y ∈ F2p . The security implied by this choice of fields (lower bit-length
than standardized counterparts possibly combined with composite degree) is
discussed in the extended version of this paper [2].
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Algorithm 3 Digit serial multiplication in F2n
Require: a =
  n−1
i=0
aix
i, b =
  d−1
k=0
b˜kx
kD where b˜k =
  D−1
l=0
bl+kDx
l and f ∈ F2[x]
Ensure: c = a · b mod f(x)
1: c← 0
2: for k from 1 to d− 1 do
3: c← xD(c + b˜d−1a) mod f
4: b← xDb {Only a D-bit left shift}
5: end for
6: c← (c + b˜d−1a) mod f
7: Return c
4.3 Recovering the y coordinate of Q = k · P
In traditional solutions, after computing Q = k ·P , one is required to transform
back to affine coordinates and compute the y-coordinate of Q. We, however,
advocate a different solution. One simple solution is to send both the end values
of registers containing P1 and P2 in Algorithm 1 to the verifier so that the verifier
himself can recover the y-coordinate of Q. This would incur in the sending of four
finite field elements, corresponding to the projective coordinate representation of
P1 and P2. Alternatively, the protocol can be run by only using the x-coordinates
of all points involved. Notice that this was first observed by Miller in his seminal
paper [16]. In either case, the projective coordinates sent to the verifier should
be masked with a random value to avoid the attack described in [18]. This
requires two extra multiplications at the end of the point multiplication which
is negligible in comparison to the rest of the computation.
5 Elliptic Curve Processor Architecture
Our Elliptic Curve Processor (ECP) for RFID is shown in Fig. 2. The operational
blocks are as follows: a Control Unit(CU), an Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU), and
Memory (RAM and ROM). In ROM the ECC parameters and the constants x4
(the x-coordinate of P2−P1) and b are stored. On the other hand, RAM contains
all input and output variables and it therefore communicates with both, the
ROM and the ALU.
The CU controls scalar multiplication and point operations. In the case of
composite fields implementations, it also controls the operations in extension
fields. In addition, the controller commands the ALU which performs field mul-
tiplication, addition and squaring. The bits of k =
∑nk−1
i=0 ki2
i, ki ∈ {0, 1},
nk = dlog2ke, are evaluated from MSB to LSB resulting in the assignment of
new values for P1 and P2, dependent on the key-bit ki. This is processed in
an n-bit shift register. The CU consists of a number of simple state machines
and a counter and its area cost is small. The processor memory consists of the
equivalent to seven n-bit (n = p) registers for ordinary fields and nine n-bit
(n = 2p) registers for composite fields. The extra registers are required to store
intermediate values when performing multiplication in composite fields. Table 1
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Fig. 2. ECP Architecture. Fig. 3. ALU Architecture.
summarizes the number of cycles required for basic operations and for a whole
point multiplication in an EC over F2p .
Table 1. Cycle count for basic arithmetic operations and EC operations over F2p . L:
Load, C: Computation, S: Store
Operation L C S Total Cycles
F2p addition 2 1 1 4
F2p squaring 1 1 1 3
F2p multiplication 2 d
p−1
D
e 1 d
p−1
D
e + 3
EC operations assuming a squarer
EC addition (F2p ) 5 MUL + 1 SQ + 2 ADD = 5d
p−1
D
e + 26
EC double (F2p ) 3 MUL + 5 SQ + 1 ADD = 3d
p−1
D
e + 27
Point mult. (F2p ) (nk − 1)   8d
p−1
D
e + 53 
EC operations assuming no squarer
EC addition (F2p ) 6 MUL + 2 ADD = 6d
p−1
D
e + 26
EC double (F2p ) 8 MUL + 1 ADD = 8d
p−1
D
e + 28
Point mult. (F2p ) (nk − 1)   14d
p−1
D
e + 54 
5.1 The Arithmetic Logic Unit
The largest contribution in area to the overall design comes from the ALU,
illustrated in Fig. 3. It consists of two n-bit registers a and c, and an n-bit shift-
register b that outputs D bits at the time. In addition, the ALU has circuitry
for implementing addition, squaring and multiplication in F2n . Load and store
operations between the ALU and memory cost a single clock cycle. The ADD
block consists of n XOR gates, and the SQR block consists of at most 3n2 XOR
gates and computes F2n additions and squarings in a single clock cycle once
data has been loaded into the ALU. The MUL block implements an iteration of
Step 3 of Algorithm 3 in a single clock cycle. Multiplication is calculated then in
d = d n
D
e clock cycles. For composite fields, the field arithmetic translates to the
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arithmetic in the subfield as follows: (i) addition in F(2p)2 requires 2 additions
in F2p , (ii) multiplication in F(2p)2 requires 3 multiplications and 4 additions in
F2p , and (iii) squaring in F(2p)2 requires 2 squaring and 1 addition in F2p .
Remark 1. Our processor does not include at this moment functionality to com-
pute ae+r mod n in Schnorr’s protocol. We expect such functionality to require
no more than 1000 additional gates.
5.2 A Word Regarding Power
At the present moment, we do not have an actual chip and we lack explicit power
measurements for our simulations. Nevertheless, we believe that attaining the
power values required for RFID applications using our design is possible. In fact,
our processor architecture is very similar to the architecture presented in [27].
One particular characteristic of both designs is the usage of an Arithmetic Logic
Unit (ALU) with a full-precision data path. The differences are on the details
of our implementation: field size, choice of finite field arithmetic methodology
(Montgomery vs. dedicated trinomial or pentanomial circuits), support for mul-
tiple fields versus support for a single field, hashing versus no hashing required
in our implementation, etc. In general, our design is aimed at making our imple-
mentation as specific as possible to our particular application. This methodology
leads to significant complexity reduction in the area requirements and thus also
to power savings. Thus, since [27] was able to attain the power requirements
of an RFID system, we are confident that our design, being smaller and sim-
pler, will also attain the required power figures at the same or lower operating
frequencies.
6 Results and discussion
In this section, we provide estimates for the latency and the area complexity
of Schnorr’s protocol. As mentioned above the core part of the protocol is one
point multiplication. The results for various architectures are given in Tables 2
and 3. We considered solutions with or without the squarer as it allows also for
a trade-off between area and performance. For the case of composite fields the
ALU shrinks in size but some speed-up is then necessary which we obtain by
means of a digit-serial multiplier (instead of a bit-serial one, i.e., D = 1). The
performance in each case is calculated by use of formulae for point operations
as in Algorithm 2 and we calculate the total number of cycles for each case
assuming the numbers for field arithmetic provided in Sect. 5. The designs were
synthesized using Synopsis Design-analyzer for the frequency of 175 kHz and a
0.25 µm CMOS library. One of our main reasons for using composite fields was to
reduce the ALU’s area. This is clearly visible in Tables 2 and 3. We notice that the
ALU varies in size from 2,863 to 7,379 gates and the smallest one is obtained for
the field F(267)2 , without the squarer and with a bit-serial multiplier. However,
the performance is the worst for this case, requiring more than 2 seconds for
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Table 2. Implementation results @ 175 kHz and assuming a dedicated squarer circuit.
Implementation ALU RAM Perf. @175 kHz Area wo RAM AT factor AT f.
Digit size Field Type [kgates] [bits] [s] [kgates] [wo. RAM] [w. RAM]
D=1 F
2131
6306 917 0.81 8582 6975 11446
F
(267)2
3274 1206 1.44 6074 8734 19139
F
2139
6690 973 0.91 9044 8259 13590
D=2 F
2131
6962 917 0.43 9233 3937 6284
F
(267)2
3610 1206 0.84 6410 5359 11409
F
2139
7379 973 0.48 9734 4652 7442
F
(271)2
3648 1278 0.92 6534 6044 13137
D=3 F
(267)2
3789 1206 0.64 6589 4187 8784
F
(271)2
3833 1278 0.71 6719 4786 10248
D=4 F
(267)2
4103 1206 0.54 6903 3757 7694
F
(271)2
4152 1278 0.60 7038 4197 8769
Table 3. Implementation results @ 175 kHz and assuming no dedicated squarer circuit.
Implementation ALU RAM Perf. @175 kHz Area wo RAM AT factor AT f.
Digit size Field Type [kgates] [bits] [s] [kgates] [wo RAM] [wRAM]
D=1 F
2131
5679 917 1.39 7953 11072 18731
F
(267)2
2953 1206 2.39 5708 13648 30949
F
2139
6018 973 1.57 8380 13124 22267
D=2 F
2131
6335 917 0.72 8603 6161 10101
F
(267)2
3289 1206 1.34 6044 8085 17764
F
2139
6718 973 0.80 9079 7303 11999
F
(271)2
3463 1278 1.49 6304 9367 20759
D=3 F
(267)2
3468 1206 0.99 6224 6140 13279
F
(271)2
3647 1278 1.11 6489 7226 15764
D=4 F
(267)2
3782 1206 0.83 6537 5406 11389
F
(271)2
3967 1278 0.91 6808 6199 13180
one point multiplication. The total area without RAM includes the sizes of the
ALU, the CU, the counter and the shift-register. The largest portion of that is
occupied by the key register i.e. 1,400 and 1,500 gates for fields F2131 and F2139 ,
respectively. The control logic takes between 10% and 15% of a whole design.
In the last two columns, we computed the area-time product for two cases,
including RAM and not including RAM. To map the number of bits to be stored
to actual gates we used a factor of 6, which is conservative when using SRAM.
If we were to use dedicated embedded RAM, it would be possible to half the
area requirement (see for example [19, 9]), at the very least. From Table 2 and
looking at the AT-product values, we conclude that, in general, it is beneficial
to use a digit-serial multiplier and a squarer. However, these options are not the
most compact. For compactness one should choose an implementation without
squarer. The total area is expressed without RAM for two reasons. First, it is
hard to exactly map it to the corresponding number of gates and second, most
tags have RAM available. Some high-end tags have therefore the possibility to
store 1,000 bits, which would be enough in some cases presented in Table 2. We
compare our results with other related work in Table 4. It is hard to compare
with other related work as there is no previous ECC implementation suitable
for RFIDs. We chose here the architecture with the best timing although it is
possible to have an adequate solution requiring a total of 13,646 gates with a
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performance that is still below 1 second (0.84 sec). We stress here again that
we obtain these figures by including very conservative estimates for RAM in the
total gate count. In fact, a RAM cell that requires 6 equivalent gates to be im-
plemented is a register cell. A typical full-custom RAM cell requires somewhere
between 1 and 2 equivalent gates, thus bringing the total area required for the
design under 10,000 gates. Other optimizations involve the shift register for the
key, which is of full length and requires 1,500 gates. This can still be improved
by loading the key in two or more parts, thus, reducing the area significantly.
Table 4. Performance and area of different algorithms and implementations
Source Algorithm Finite field/ Area Technology Op. Frequency Performance
Parameter Size [gates] [µm] [kHz] [ms]
[6] NTRUEncrypt N = 167, p = 3, q = 128 3000 0.13 500 58.45
[3] AES block size = 128 bits 3595 0.35 100 10.2 (1016 cycles)
[12] SHA-1 data size = 512 bits 4276 0.13 500 0.81 (405 cycles)
this work (smallest area) EC F
(267)2
12,944 0.25 175 2.39 sec.
this work (smallest AT
product, fastest)
EC F
2131
14,735 0.25 175 430
[6] EC Fp100
18,720 0.13 500 410.5
[27] EC F
2191
and Fp192
23,000 0.35 68,500 6.7
[21] EC Fp166
30,333 0.13 20,000 31.9
7 Concluding Remarks
This work provides evidence that ECC on RFID might be a viable solution in
the near future. This is important as it allows much more sophisticated proto-
cols based on public-key cryptography than currently being considered for use
in RFID. We investigated several options considering ECC over F2p , p a prime,
operands ranging between 130 and 140 bits in length, and composite fields. We
also considered different ALU configurations to obtain more compact and still
acceptable performance. We follow design criteria that would lead to low-power
implementations, i.e. we try to minimize the area and reduce the operating
frequency. The best architecture with respect to both area and performance is
slightly larger than 10,000 gates. Future work will investigate the exact amount
of power consumed by our processors, the cost of side-channel attack counter-
measures, and concentrate on the further investigation of protocols based on
public-key cryptography for RFID.
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